Daniele Carminati

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Dec 17 2025

Five years ago, I published an article titledThe State of Chinas Soft Power in 2020. In its opening, I noted that Chinas ability to attract was a subject of both frequent discussion and misunderstanding. Since then, despite ongoing challenges in geopolitics and the economy, China has become an even more prominent global presence. This raises an important question: is Chinese soft power still elusive, or is it finally taking shape? This matter is especially relevant given thegrowing debateabout thedecline of American soft powerafter a shift toward coercivehard and economic powersuch as peace through strength and unilateral tariffs which reflects a broaderweaponization of the world economy.This piece will adhere to the structure of my previous article, utilizing thelate Joseph Nyes triad of soft power resources culture, political values, and foreign policies while further developing them through a broader analysis ofattractive national featuressupported by authoritative opinions and relevant data. Back then, quoting my concise overview, Chinas culture still ha[d]limited appeal, its values mostly fail[ed] to reflect the countrys image and reputation abroad, and its foreign policy [was] seen with skepticism at best and ashegemonic at worst. What has changed in these five turbulent years in which we experienced a global pandemic, the eruption of two major and still lingering conflicts in Ukraine and Palestine, and a global tariffs shakeup?

In 2017, Foreign Policy asked,Why is China so uncool?The answer lied in a core tenet of soft power: attraction mainly arises from a countrys civil society, not its government. Yet, across 2025, I came across pieces asking questions such as:Is China the new Cool?, hinting at marked perceptual changes within less than a decade. The Economist to my surprise went even further, when publishing a piece titledHow China became cool, not if. Several outlets, includingForeign Policyitself and theAsia Society, further examined this topic, noting achievements like the global success of the toy monster Labubu, the animated film Ne Zha 2, and the video game Black Myth: Wukong. TheSouth China Morning Postalso explored whether these successes reflect a possible relaxation of government control over cultural production.

Cultural promotion rarely faces resistance unless it appears propagandistic or imperialist. However, promoting political values is more controversial, and Chinas progress in this area remains uneven. While China seldom highlights its communist roots abroad,authoritarianism has gained appeal, and Beijings promotional effortshave seen some success. Additionally, while domestic economic growth is decelerating, leaders in developing countries still remember how the nations appealingeconomic modelwhich promotes values associated with a strong state and social stability helped lift hundreds of millions out of poverty, and it continues to do so. Whether China is exporting its model remains debated, but Beijing is actively promoting change through itsGlobal Initiatives, which, though intentionally broad, cover key areas including civilization, security, and AI governance. Combined with itsreluctant climate leadership role, China is at the center of major socioeconomic and political shifts that bring new responsibilities and expectations. These developments are closely linked to foreign policy, particularly the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI reflects Beijings aspirations as the leader of the developing world, which has generallywelcomed new infrastructure, technologies, traineeships, and cultural exchanges through itsConfucius Institutes. In 2020, I stated that the BRI appear[ed] to be the countrys best shot to prove its detractors wrong. Althoughefforts have been madetodebunk debt-trap diplomacyclaims, criticism remains. However, major projects naturally face challenges and delays, especially at a global scale, and no viable alternatives have emerged from critics. For now, thesoft-economic appealof the new silk roadendures, despite mixed results. Furthermore, not to be dismissed, China has been granting visa-free access to a growing number of countries for several years now; a move that has been widely appreciated andresulted in record visits. Perceptions of openness accurate or not boost reputation.

Beyond my observations and before giving my updated take what do some of the sharpest observers of Chinas soft power dynamics argue? Irene S. Wu, a long-time researcher of the intersection between communications technology and politics, who more recently devised aquantitative rubric to measure soft powerin international relations, observed that since China opened itself to the world, its soft power ranking was always in thetop 20 countries. However, although tourists and students are increasingly welcome, there is still resistance towards long-term migrants. Joshua Kurlantzick, who wrote the pioneeringCharm Offensive: How Chinas Soft Power Is Transforming the Worldin 2007, and inspired my investigations into soft-economic power interactions, followed up withBeijings Global Media Offensivein late 2022. Although the scope sounds narrower (or broader, depending on perspectives), the core message is clear: the view that Chinas ability to project soft power through its media industries and its global influence campaigns [is] quite limited, and [that] its ability to wield influence within the domestic politics of other countries [is] nonexistent no longer holds true. This connects to awell-known quotefrom Nye: In a global Information Age, victory also depends upon whose story wins. Since 2013, Xi Jinping has recognized this point and encouraged the Chinese people totell Chinas story well.

How is this endeavor going so far?

Maria Repnikova, one of theforemost expertson Chinese soft power, contends that Chinadoes not offera clear vision of its role in the global order. For the time being, she notes, Chinas ideology centers on resentment toward the West, without offering a clear global vision or policy model. Many abroad remain wary of China, particularly as a leader. Still, Beijings cautious stance may be intentional, letting it avoid overcommitment and scrutiny while gaining from the U.S. retreat. TheGlobal Soft Power Indexranks nation brands and highlights Chinas progress since 2020, moving from eighth to second place by 2025. China scores high in Familiarity, with improving Reputation post-pandemic and fluctuating Influence. Its weakest areas are Media & Communication and People & Values, while Business & Trade and Education & Science lead. The U.S. remains first, but China is steadily closing the gap.

Thus, what are the main takeaways from the past five years?

The blend of soft-economic power, whether intentional or not, is yieldingpositive outcomesthroughout much of the developing world, where pragmatism takes precedence over patronizing or moralistic ideological approaches. These results stem from tangible accomplishments and genuine acknowledgement, although none are guaranteed or permanent. Building a positive reputation is challenging, and it can be quickly lost if trust and legitimacy wane. These improvements are evident both in sociocultural terms such as increased appreciation forChinese products and brandsand through theperceived benefits of the BRIas well as broader economic exchanges.

In line with this, I stand by my claim that China seems to adapt its strategies to each country, and its soft power sharpens upon necessity. This largely reflects thedouble-edged nature of interdependence, which can be weaponized into coercion or used to co-opt towards win-win cooperation. These dynamics are ever evolving, and it would be premature to provide a univocal verdict on such a complex scenario. Nevertheless, perceptions matter, and Trumps America First policy may be serving Chinas interests as the former isno longer recognizedas a model of stability and reliability. More generally, these significant developments may indicate the emergence of apost-liberal understanding of soft power, although its defining characteristics remain ambiguous and appear to be more a response to disruption than a unified or compelling blueprint for a new global order.

To conclude, China has amassed more resources than ever across the board both hard and soft but greaterchallenges and uncertaintiesare also mounting up. That said, Chinas gains are hard to deny, but five years are not enough to define a new paradigm of attraction in international relations. As mentioned in 2020, Beijing remains eager to test the boundaries between attraction and inducement, with even more confidence, but I also still believe that the countrys intents are firstly economic and only secondly ideological and political, especially consideringdomestic interests to be prioritized. The degree to which China can assume a position of global leadership remains uncertain at this time. However, Beijing might not need to fill the vacuum on its own, while opting instead to share the burden with other engaged stakeholders, particularlyfrom the Eastand the South, who would likely welcome opportunities for genuine shared prosperity.

Is this wishful thinking or pragmatic idealism? We might need to wait a few more years to answer this.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

• The State of Chinas Soft Power in 2020
• Confucius Institutes in Argentina and Chinas Soft Power Strategy
• Chinas Belt and Road Initiative: Debt Trap or Soft Power Catalyst?
• The Securitization of Chinese Soft Power
• The Irrelevance of Soft Power
• The State of Japans Soft Power After the 2020 Olympics

About The Author(s)

Daniele Carminatiis a lecturer in International Relations and Diplomacy at Mahidol University International College and holds a PhD in International Relations from the City University of Hong Kong. His research interest revolves around the sociocultural, economic, and political implications of globalization in East and Southeast Asia with a particular focus on soft power dynamics. Daniele is also a former commissioning editor at E-International Relations.

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